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In a society in which law and lawyers have always exercised dispropor-
tionate influence, it remains to be seen whether the profession can play a
role in meeting the crisis in governmental bureaucracy and regulation to-
day at the municipal, state, and federal levels. In many ways, this crisis is
linked to the extraordinary influence of lawyers in public policy beginning
with the New Deal. Professor Simon ascribes much of the transformation
of the welfare system to the conquest of the power of the social work
profession by lawyers and managers.' Parallel developments occurred in
other government agencies. The resulting approach to management in
government agencies often seems a caricature of modern management
techniques. It is difficult to imagine that a business run like the welfare
system Professor Simon describes could survive, except perhaps as a mo-
nopoly. But the swing from intrusive paternalism to legalism and formal-
ism-to use Professor Simon's formulation-is not peculiar to the welfare
system. It parallels and is facilitated by the complexities of life in an ad-
vanced society and by technological changes that encourage the use of
more structured and rigorous procedures. Government agencies, busi-
nesses, universities, and other institutions are facing questions of first im-
pression in organization and in service or product delivery that will pro-
foundly affect the way they deal with their publics and their employees.
The travail of the welfare bureaucracy, as it shed its intrusive persona
only to become an over-instructed robot, warns of the danger of dialectic
and the elusiveness of a satisfactory solution. As the technology to stand-
ardize organizational behavior improves, an easy marriage of law and
technology could produce a satanic union with unintended and unhappy
results.
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University.
1. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALB L.J. 1198
(1983).
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I.
Professor Simon believes that something close to this has already oc-
curred in the welfare system. The liberal bar encouraged the expansion of
judicial discretion, partly to empower judges to overrule the administrative
decisions the lawyers were challenging. At the same time, the bar suc-
ceeded in reducing administrative discretion in bureaucracies, such as the
welfare system. The tradeoff for recipients was loss of the personalized
treatment of the old system in return for a kind of objectivity that was not
always beneficial.
Something akin to Professor Simon's "dominant vision," the post-New
Deal law reform model, became pervasive in many government agencies
in the 1960's and 1970's, which produced their own versions of the wel-
fare agency crisis. As agency actions came increasingly under the scrutiny
of lawyers and courts, substantive and procedural law and management
techniques were often used to minimize discretion and maximize organi-
zational formality so as to reduce arbitrariness in the bureaucracy. Profes-
sor Simon describes the paradoxes that have resulted in the welfare sys-
tem, especially the elimination of much of the social service and
individualized treatment that might be thought necessary to humanize a
system that deals with the basic needs of people. But he rejects the dialec-
tical poles of both rigid rule-bound bureaucracy and agency standards so
lax that discretion is easily abused.
Cautiously and critically, Professor Simon attempts a synthesis that he
describes as no more than a "prescriptive theme" in what is primarily a
"historical and critical" essay' largely devoted to two competing views of
welfare administration. He advocates an "opposed vision involv[ing] a le-
gality of relative informality, a decentralized enforcement structure, and a
corps of enforcers with some of the attributes of skill, education, and sta-
tus associated with professionalism."3 The competing or opposed view at-
tempts to synthesize the two visions but partakes more of the original
New Deal social work administration of the welfare system than it does of
the post-New Deal law reform model.
4
II.
I would like to look more closely at Professor Simon's dominant and
opposed visions, using my own government experience as a frame of refer-
ence. I have encountered vivid examples of both "visions" in government
administration, especially at the municipal level, from which I draw much
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of this discussion. In New York City, I headed two government agen-
cies-the New York City Commission on Human Rights and, simultane-
ously, the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG).5 Later, I headed a
federal agency, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC).6 What the government agencies I headed had in com-
mon were seriously flawed bureaucratic mechanisms 7 paralleling those of
the welfare system described by Professor Simon. The resulting bureau-
cratic crises offered a rare opportunity to rethink and redesign both struc-
ture and operations. Normally, the press of business and of public de-
mands for immediate relief encourage bureaucrats to correct malfunctions
in an ad hoc way that often compounds the overall problems of the bu-
reaucracy; there is little incentive to engage in diagnosis or careful recon-
struction of failed systems. However, the agencies I shall discuss faced
especially difficult problems, requiring more systematic treatment.
Because Professor Simon's criticism is particularly relevant to govern-
ment administration at the municipal level, I rely here principally on the
New York City neighborhood government experience, although the re-
form of the EEOC addressed some of Professor Simon's major concerns,
including the reconciliation of fairness with efficiency" and the downgrad-
ing of the work force.9 The problems and changes Professor Simon de-
scribes are more visible on the local level. Of course, public reaction to
perceived bureaucratic excesses is less well formed than on other political
issues because government organization is an elusive target for populist
discontent. But politicians have succeeded in arousing public feeling about
5. I held the chair of the New York City Commission on Human Rights from 1970 to 1977 and
simultaneously carried out unrelated duties as executive assistant to Mayor John Lindsay from 1972
to 1974. In my capacity as executive assistant, the mayor's ONG reported to me.
6. I held the chair of the EEOC from 1977 to 1981.
7. ONG, a small temporary agency attached to the mayor's office was formed to redesign and
improve the bureaucracies of other municipal agencies. Its structure and processes are not in issue.
8. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that in a test of the new procedures, case
processing time was 44 days from the date of filing to resolution; that when the procedures were put
in place in all offices a 50% settlement (remedy) rate was achieved, as compared with 11% under the
old procedures; and that the average monetary benefit rose almost 150%, from $1400 under the old
procedures to $3400. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, EEOC ENFORCEMENT AC-
TIVITIES 8-9 (1981).
9. For example, the intake of discrimination complaints had been a clerical function with almost
no judgment required, resulting in the receipt of many inappropriate and non-jurisdictional com-
plaints and the growth of a large backlog. The reformed procedures used professional investigators for
intake procedures, and enlarged both the scope and the responsibilities of the intake interview to
include eliciting a complete set of facts and available evidence from the client. Enhancement of the
intake investigator's functions both to aid the investigative process and to refer people elsewhere if
they required other services, helped to streamline the overall process and avoid backlogs. The investi-
gation process became more professional. Investigators no longer followed a time-consuming, largely
paper, investigation. They took on the trappings of administrative law judges but used negotiation
rather than litigation as the basic process of dispute resolution. The face-to-face fact-finding process
brought both sides together and quickly got the important facts out to provide a realistic basis for each
side to judge the possibilities for success and enable the investigator to settle most cases.
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the responsiveness and salaries of civil servants, the cost of government,
and overregulation. These concerns are felt most intensely at the munici-
pal level. It is there that the individual citizen is immediately and tangibly
a client of government services.
In New York City in the 1970's, the ONG sought to address citizen
disaffection with the delivery of services. ONG was engaged in very de-
tailed, often technical and managerial work to administratively decentral-
ize New York City's service delivery departments, such as sanitation and
police. The ONG sought to put greater control and decisionmaking in the
hands of civil service line managers and their subordinates as a means of
improving the delivery of services to the city's many diverse neighbor-
hoods. In the 1960's and 1970's, several neighborhood empowerment ex-
periments had produced confusion and polarization without tangible im-
provements in neighborhood life. In the wake of these failures and
problems, neighborhoods were responsive to the more mundane and fo-
cused work of the ONG. This tolerance of the ONG's methodical ap-
proach apparently developed because of the priority that hard-pressed
neighborhoods of all income and ethnic compositions placed on improved
city services as urban conditions deteriorated.
In most large cities, increasingly difficult urban conditions produced
disenchantment with some of the great reforms in municipal management
from earlier in this century, especially the professionalization of services
in hierarchically organized departments run largely by civil servants.'"
These reforms parallel those of the dominant vision Professor Simon de-
scribes in the welfare system-a formal hierarchical bureaucracy and a
subordinated employee cadre whose discretionary power has been re-
placed, over the years, by objective rules and standards. One articulation
of the phenomenon in city bureaucracy sounds strikingly like Simon's
description of the welfare system. John Mudd, a key figure in the 1970's
in New York City's bureaucratic reform efforts, writes that city services
had fallen victim to:
(1) programmatic specialization in an expanding range of services;
(2) the centralization of executive authority; and (3) the rise of new
institutional constraints that simultaneously undercut the territorial
political party without replacing its capacity to articulate local needs
or adapt general policies to particular concerns. Many of these devel-
opments reflect successes in implementing key parts of the municipal
reform agenda for rooting out the corruption of the clubhouse
politicians."
10. T. DYE, POLITICS IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 225-57 (1977).
11. J. Mudd, Government in Urban Neighborhoods: Reorganization Strategies to Improve Public
Services in Big Cities 33 (1978) (unpublished Harvard University Ph.D. dissertation). John Mudd
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In municipal governments, the growth of specialized departments dis-
tanced the professional civil service that operated them from the neighbor-
hoods they served, and lodged administrative responsibility in a mayor
who often resembled a business executive. These changes came at the ex-
pense of the service- and patronage-oriented political party, which, like
Simon's professional social workers, had provided personalized attention
to citizens' needs. It was in reaction to the favoritism, corruption and
fraud within these parties that government reformed employment prac-
tices by replacing patronage employees with professional civil servants se-
lected according to legally mandated standards and tests.
Parallels to the transformation Professor Simon describes are discerni-
ble in two contrasting descriptions of the way government helped families
before and after the advent of civil service reform. In the early 1900's in
New York, Boss George W. Plunkitt said:
What tells in holdin' your grip on your district is to go right down
among the poor families and help them in the different ways they
need help. I've got a regular system for this. If there's a fire in
Ninth, Tenth, or Eleventh Avenue, . . . any hour of the day or
night, I'm usually there with some of my election district captains as
soon as the fire engines. If a family is burned out, . . . I don't refer
them to the Charity Organization Society, which would investigate
their case in a month or two and decide they were worthy of help
about the time they are dead from starvation. I just get quarters for
them, buy clothes for them. . . and fix them up til they get things
runnin' again."
In the early 1970's, Mudd reports, the Standard Operating Procedures
of the New York Fire Department provided:
For a family caught in a burn-out, the Fire Department's battalion
chief at the scene issues a written "notification of possible need for
temporary or permanent shelter for persons due to fire" for the occu-
pants . . . and calls his dispatcher who in turn informs the central
Emergency Desk at the Department of Relocation, which reports the
case to their [sic] personnel in the nearest hotel or shelter that the
agency uses for such cases-if the fire is between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday. If not, the fire dispatcher notifies the Red
was deputy director of ONG when I was the mayor's executive assistant with responsibility for the
ONG. I am grateful to John Mudd for sharing with me his thesis and the epilogue to a book in
progress based on the thesis. His work is the only comprehensive examination of the attempt to ad-
ministratively decentralize various New York City government management and service functions in
the 1970's.
12. See W. RIORDAN, PLUNKITr OF TAMMANY HALL 27-28 (1963); J. Mudd, supra note 11, at
71.
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Cross, which places the family overnight and refers the case to relo-
cation officials in the morning-assuming the family is living in a
private dwelling. If the house or apartment is owned by a public
agency like the New York City Housing Authority, the Department
of Real Estate, or Urban Renewal, the Department of Relocation
has no jurisdiction. In these cases, the Department of Social Services
is responsible, if the family is already on public assistance or quali-
fies for special emergency aid. After the family is housed, it must
make an appointment at the nearest Income Maintenance (Welfare)
Center for an interview to apply for a "disaster relief grant" cover-
ing clothes, food, and lost furniture; arrange for children to go to
schools in a new area, since the shelters are usually not in the same
community; and begin to look for an apartment with the assistance
of housing staff in the Departments of Relocation or Social
Services.13
The judgments Simon makes about the history of welfare reform have
echoes in John Mudd's appraisal of municipal service agencies following
civil service reform:
Many of the virtues in the institutions and values of the earlier re-
formers now appeared to be defects. The civil service (and unioniza-
tion) protected public employees not only from the vagaries of politi-
cal whim but from the need to respond to new direction.
Bureaucratic efficiency came to mean red tape, with questioned [sic]
gains over the older forms of corruption. Objectivity in administra-
tion led to inflexibility. Professionalism brought the benefits of ex-
pert knowledge but also a disregard for client judgments-a situation
exacerbated in central cities by the increasing racial differences be-
tween the providers and the recipients of services. Programmatic spe-
cialization focused attention on parochial fragments of problems,
rather than their interrelatedness. Centralization for the public good
produced insensitivity to the particular needs of individuals or local
communities.14
13. J. Mudd, supra note 11, at 72.
14. Id. at 49-50. Here is one of Mudd's telling examples:
A neighborhood police . . . commander is . . . harangued by local homeowners in . . . the
northern Bronx. They complain that the sanitation streetsweepers . . . drive . . . without
touching the mess in the gutters because commuters . . . jam their block with parked cars.
Diligently, the sergeant files a report, which goes through police supervisory channels over to
the Sanitation Department, where the problem is referred back down the chain of command to
the district superintendent in the community. He in turn requests that 8 a.m.-9 a.m. no-park-
ing regulations be installed because his sweeper operates on this schedule . . . . The recom-
mendation goes back up through the sanitation hierarchy where it is duly forwarded to the
Traffic Department. Traffic sends out an investigator who turns down the suggestions because
the department has never approved no-parking 8 a.m.-9 a.m. on a non-metered street.
Id. at viii.
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Government tended to become dominated by bureaucracy itself; judgment
and discretion were exercised at increasingly higher levels, service was un-
even, and correct procedures became ends unto themselves.
As a result, in the 1960's and 1970's, there was a populist reaction
against the old municipal reforms. The civil service was the focal point of
much of the criticism. However, city governments were also strained by
the age and deterioration of the cities, the loss of jobs, population and tax
diversity, and by the needs of large concentrations of newly vocal poor and
minority populations. Nevertheless, the old city bureaucracies were
blamed for failing in their essential function of delivering basic services.
The reaction took the form of demands for more decentralized control of
government and prdduced citizen movements with many of the trappings
of the welfare rights movement. Nowhere was the demand greater or the
experimentation with neighborhood models more varied than in New
York City. This is not surprising. The size and complexity of New York
accentuated the urban pressures that were being felt everywhere.
The decentralization that resulted was not a lasting or satisfactory al-
ternative to the old reformed model of municipal government. Professor
Simon sets out the ingredients necessary to develop a viable alternative.
He seeks reconciliation, not reaction, and strives to bring together the best
of the old and new approaches. 15 What occurred in New York and many
cities was reaction. The citizen revolt could hardly have been expected to
take account of the multiple variables necessary to produce a satisfactory
reform of municipal organization. The citizen response assumed that if
the bureaucracy was malfunctioning, it could be improved by making it
accountable through citizen participation. By the early 1970's, sixty-five
percent of American cities and counties with populations over 25,000 had
established citizen advisory groups in some form to improve service deliv-
ery.t These efforts to bring citizens closer to government were legitimate
and logical responses to urban distress, and they represented an important
new direction in American cities in the 1960's and 1970's. Yet, whatever
the benefits of citizen participation, long-standing, powerful governmental
bureaucracies were hardly prepared to cede power. Citizens lacked the
time, skill, and sophistication necessary to reform the bureaucracy. Thus,
public attention gravitated toward a more tangible strategy. An emphasis
on citizen participation, even citizen power, developed as an alternative to
bureaucratic power. Citizens created their own formal structures to com-
pete with or replace existing governmental structures. Mudd's description
of the paradox that resulted illuminates Simon's view of the difficulty of
15. Simon, supra note 1, at 1200.
16. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE NEW GRASS ROOTS GOVERN-
MENT: DECENTRALIZATION AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN URBAN AREAS 9-10 (1972).
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post-New Deal reform efforts:
Given the frequent antagonism between central managers and citizen
participants, there was an ironic similarity in their assumptions
about the techniques to change bureaucratic behavior. Both presup-
posed that formal authority would increase accountability and im-
prove performance .... 17
Many citizen participation models were tried in New York City: com-
munity planning boards, neighborhood councils, local school boards, citi-
zen advisory committees for various city services and their federally man-
dated counterparts, Model Cities boards and Community Action (poverty)
Program boards. Neither in New York nor in other large cities were there
any substantial effects on city services. The bureaucracy was too well in-
sulated by old reforms such as civil service tenure that often extended even
to managerial levels.
After these efforts played themselves out, frustration with exclusive reli-
ance on citizen participatory strategies produced its own instructive reac-
tion. No new view of municipal organization developed. But a gradual
process began in New York to combine the most functional elements of
the old municipal systems and the new decentralized citizen-centered
experience.
The ONG was in the vanguard of this effort. Formed in 1970, the
ONG sought to provide an alternative to the poles of centralized mayoral
and agency power on the one hand and demands for decentralized neigh-
borhood power on the other. Exhaustion from failed efforts to transfer
power from government professionals to citizen activists had helped create
an atmosphere conducive to the less dramatic work of making the bureau-
cracy serve its citizen clients. ONG profited from a newly recognized real-
ity that it was able to document by 1970: that "[c]ivic leaders in urban
neighborhoods want concrete service improvements, not abstract power."18
Not only in New York but in other cities, "[m]ost [civic leaders] seem to
favor some middle ground between the extremes of traditional centralized
city government and community control."'19
In place of exclusive reliance on decentralization through citizen partic-
ipation, the ONG sought to decentralize management, although citizen
participation was important in the overall process of reform. In the ONG
diagnosis, like that of Professor Simon, the problems of the bureaucracy
flowed in part from excessive centralization of decisionmaking and respon-
17. J. Mudd, supra note 11, at 96-97.
18. Id. at 396.
19. Id. at 397.
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sibility. ONG proposed to reach citizens, not so much through the use of
formal citizen structures, as by giving city employees the authority to deal
directly with citizen needs.
The essential strategy was command decentralization-ceding authority
to line managers and their subordinates, whose work and positions neces-
sarily placed them close to the neighborhoods. These employees were em-
powered to act on neighborhood problems without first navigating up the
bureaucracy and then back down again after receiving permission to carry
out a solution, or worse, after the solution was devised above, far from the
realities of neighborhood problems. This process was an attempt to re-
verse the proletarianization of the work force that Professor Simon de-
scribes in the welfaie system. New York City services had suffered from
dramatic subordination of workers throughout the ranks, including mana-
gerial and supervisory level civil servants, who were relegated to higher
level counterparts of Professor Simon's welfare workers. The effects on
residents and neighborhoods were not unlike those on the welfare clients
that Professor Simon describes. Like the social service aspects of the wel-
fare system, police and sanitation services atrophied. With command de-
centralization, ONG sought to transfer decisionmaking and power from
headquarters in Manhattan to line officers and civil servants in the
neighborhoods.
At the same time, ONG tried to cure horizontal bureaucratic isolation
and dysfunction by creating a structure to assure appropriate integration
of service delivery-the district cabinet. It was composed of up to fifteen of
the major line managers with responsibility for services provided in a
neighborhood: the police precinct captain, the district health officer, the
parks foreman, the sanitation district superintendent, and others. The dis-
trict cabinet was an instrument to overcome the negative effects of the
division of labor inherent in the specialized departments.20 The ONG
concept sought to deal simultaneously with alienation among parts of the
same city bureaucracy through the district service cabinets, and with
alienation between civil servants and citizens through decentralization of
decisionmaking.
Although Professor Simon's opposed vision is linked to "legal norms,"
he believes that these "must be qualified and mediated . . .[by] non-legal
practices and institutions."21 The ONG attempt to put the line manager
and the civil servant close to the citizen client is the analogue of putting
the social worker back into the welfare system. In both cases, service that
20. In Professor Simon's discussion, this division is exemplified by the decomposition of the wel-
fare worker's job into "many more specialized functions," including the separation of social service
and financial assistance. Simon, supra note 1, at 1216.
21. Id. at 1243.
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meets the felt needs of the citizen is considered an indispensable function
of the bureaucracy. The values Professor Simon articulates, especially in-
dividual participation and "relatively individualized communication by
decisionmakers or professional advocates,12 2 were at the heart of the
ONG experiment.
That experiment did not run its course. Outside events determined its
fate, especially the 1973 elections, which brought to power a new mayor
who chose not to identify with the previous mayor's programs. Moreover,
a charter reform referendum that originated in the citizen participation
mood of earlier years was passed in 1975. Nevertheless, it was influenced
by the ONG experiment with district service cabinets. In practice, how-
ever, management decentralization was subordinated to the community
planning heads who received new powers in the politically important land
use and budget areas. Without leadership interested in the imperfections
of the bureaucracy as such, the district cabinet members became complaint
retailers. They never institutionalized a new command structure to per-
sonalize service or completed the ONG's plan to eliminate most com-
plaints concerning service lapses. The district cabinets were reduced to
handling complaints on an individual basis. It is true that many profes-
sionals in the New York City bureaucracy today recognize the need to
come to grips with the ONG attempt to disentangle and humanize the
bureaucracy. Many of ONG's core ideas have continued to influence city
bureaucratic behavior. On balance, however, the integration of services
and the decentralization of power to professional civil servants to bring
service closer to citizen clients are still ideas for the future.
III.
Although Professor Simon disavows the fashioning of remedies as a pri-
mary purpose of his essay, he ventures prescriptive ideas that seem anticli-
mactic and ineffective after his bold criticisms. To be sure, his suggestions
clearly have been adjusted in light of an assessment of the unlikelihood of
obtaining extensive changes, but they just as clearly flow from Professor
Simon's analysis. He proposes a "modest reform" 2 3-the replacement of
the present rigid quality control system in welfare with review procedures
and hearings. Simon may choose this approach because there is already an
appeal system to build upon. But, particularly as the exclusive way to
control abuse, resort to hearing mechanisms, even for limited reform pur-
poses, has several drawbacks. The most expensive, slowest and least direct
way to improve a bureaucracy and control errors is through due process
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1267.
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machinery employed after the fact. Although selected precedents would be
published, they could not be self-executing, and it is doubtful that they
would adequately deter bureaucratic excess.
To avoid such problems as resort to appeals only by knowledgeable
clients and the relegation of staff to clerk-like roles, Professor Simon sets
up a complicated system for initiation of proceedings. In his view, review
could be sought not only by aggrieved recipients, as presently, but also by
employees who disagree with instructions from superiors. In addition, em-
ployees would be empowered to secure a sample of cases to take to hear-
ing. Even if the present governmental climate were more tolerant of the
elaboration of hearing procedures, there would be strong arguments
against their use. Overreliance on hearings to correct errors produces de-
lays and backlogs. As in the dominant vision, which Professor Simon criti-
cizes, exclusive reliance on legal strategies to cure bureaucratic problems
is likely to produce its own set of problems, given the rigidity inherent in
legal processes, even under the best of circumstances. In any case, to insin-
uate quality control through appeal mechanisms without even attempting
prophylactic measures aimed at the first-level bureaucracy is too indirect
either to be cost effective or to correct the largest number of problems.
Professor Simon seems to advocate these reforms largely because they
appear possible to him, not because they approximate his ideal. He be-
lieves that "more thoroughgoing reforms would require more adventurous
decentralization and redistribution of wealth, power, and status.""' Yet
the chances may be greater that his more comprehensive reforms, at least
some of them, will find acceptance sooner than the peculiar and highly
unorthodox review procedures he advocates. For example, he suggests an
"organizational structure . . . that . . is more decentralized and
prescribes a higher degree of education, skill, status, and reward for front-
line decisionmakers. ' ' 25 While reforms of this magnitude may be unable to
elicit the requisite political support today, public assistance may well be
ripe for overhaul because of widespread public dissatisfaction from all
parts of the political spectrum. Neither the reforms of the sixties and sev-
enties nor the drastic cuts of the eighties have restored public confidence.
Meanwhile, today, growing numbers of children-including the majority
of black children in this country-are born to single women,
26 most of
them poor.27 These frustrations, combined with unparalleled public dis-
satisfaction with the program, may create opportunities to do more than
24. Id. at 1269.
25. Id. at 1241.
26. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICA'S BLACK POPULATION: 1970-1982, A STATISTICAL
VIEW, Series PIO/POP-83-1, 2 (1983).
27. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PER-
SONS IN THE UNITED STATES, Series P60, No. 134, 21 (1981).
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tinker with public assistance. ONG experiences may yet be instructive.
The command decentralization experience demonstrates the potential to
reverse the rigidification of bureaucracies. The most basic lesson of the
New York City government experience is that the tendency of an overcen-
tralized, hierarchical system to break down or malfunction, when con-
fronted with accumulated problems, may encourage decentralized admin-
istrative reform not unlike Professor Simon's ideal.
IV.
Concentration on organizational forms should not lead us to overlook
the pressing need to reassess the basic goals of many welfare programs.
My own view of Professor Simon's essay is colored by the difficulty I have
in regarding present welfare approaches, even Simon's suggestions for im-
provement, with equanimity. The New Deal invention of public assis-
tance for mothers who had no means to support their children was a ma-
jor contribution. But AFDC in anything resembling its present form is an
anachronism that cannot adequately serve most of its present clientele.
Over the years, welfare has become a negative symbol of outsized propor-
tions to all parties to the debate. The AFDC program, for example, was
created for society's exceptions in the 1930's, when a relatively small
number of children were left in the care of widows, or divorced or sepa-
rated women. The program was never designed to support large numbers
of victims of other problems, such as structural and cyclical unemploy-
ment, racial discrimination, and generational poverty and disadvantage. If
the New Deal welfare program was not meant to be a multi-purpose re-
sponse to such complicated problems, it will not become so by moderniz-
ing and humanizing the old New Deal bureaucracy. Still, the Orwellian
bureaucracy that has emerged as the present welfare system needs criti-
cism, not only for its own sake but also so that its features as a negative
model may be understood.
Experience has taught that dependence on the present program to aid
impoverished families, however structured, will likely continue to prove
socially unsatisfactory and costly. To succeed, an agency that offers sup-
port for young women and children should return to the New Deal aim of
helping a small number of exceptional cases who cannot expect to become
financially independent. For what has become the mainstream clientele of
AFDC, other programs must be created with new assumptions and new
goals. This is an urgent necessity in light of the rapid growth of depen-
dent female-headed households.2 In a rich democracy, a welfare clientele
28. Between 1970 and 1981, female-headed households increased by 97%. Half of all poor fami-
lies were headed by women in 1981. U.S. COMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, A GROWING CRISIS: DISADVAN-
TAGED WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN 5-7 (1983).
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that has become so large, pervasive, and homogeneous may be the best
evidence of the need for other solutions, especially when that clientele con-
sists of millions of young women and children for whom self-sufficiency
and economic independence, rather than maintenance, would seem to be
the natural and most appropriate goals.
When public assistance was established in the New Deal, few women
worked, and child care, except by mothers, was frowned upon. Training
and education to prepare women for a lifetime of work was the exception.
Today these have become routine expectations for young American
women. If welfare clients have not been reached by the education and
training institutions that have helped create a future for their counter-
parts, then their matriculation through welfare could become the occasion
for reaching these recipients. The extraordinary desire for training and
work shown by women on welfare is matched only by the unavailability
of such opportunities. As presently conceived, AFDC resembles programs
for the aged and the disabled who can no longer work. Given the youth
and pliability of most of these women, models that contemplate graduation
in the manner of education and training programs seem more appropriate
solutions than maintenance programs, however remodeled. The greater
costs incurred in the short term for programs providing training and child
care structured for graduation and independence would surely be more
cost effective than the billions spent in the maintenance bureaucracy, old,
new or improved, that Professor Simon so tellingly describes and
criticizes.
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